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The Coasean Framework of the
New York City Watershed Agreement
Geoffrey Black, D. Allen Dalton,
Samia Islam, and Aaron Batteen
Over 50 years ago, in “The Problem of Social Cost,” Ronald Coase
(1960) attempted to reorient the economics profession’s treatment of
externalities. He wanted to draw economists’ attention away from the
world of pure competition as a policy standard and investigate the
consequences of transaction costs and property rights for the operation of markets. In 1991, he was awarded the Nobel prize in economics “for his discovery and clarification of the significance of
transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure
and functioning of the economy” (Royal Swedish Academy of
Sciences 1991). The Academy cited both his 1960 article and his
1937 article “The Nature of the Firm.”
Still, critics question both the relevance and applicability of the
Coasean framework for analyzing, explaining, and ameliorating harmful effects associated with economic activities, reflecting the degree to
which the profession’s treatment has remained unchanged. Nalebuff
(1997: 35–37), for example, has argued that for environmental problems “as the scope of the externality affects more and more people, it
becomes increasingly difficult to assign property rights.” Moreover,
“even when property rights have been assigned, exclusion is difficult
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if not impossible.” In this article, we argue that the New York City
Watershed Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) proves the usefulness of the Coasean framework—even when there are a large number of affected parties from nonpoint source pollution.
In 1997, nearly a decade after the Environmental Protection
Agency ordered New York City to filter its water to remove contaminants originating in upper New York State watersheds, NYC entered
into a MOA involving the State of New York, a number of local governments and environmental groups in the Catskills, and the EPA. In
Coasean terms, the MOA is the consequence of the State of New
York’s assignment of property rights to the Catskill/Delaware
Watershed communities to continue with regional development and
current practices, although some of those activities degrade NYC’s
drinking water. This rights assignment positioned NYC as the
responsible party for initiating negotiations and programs protecting
the Watershed system. Once responsibility was established, NYC
opted to buy lands contributing to water quality degradation (for
example, farmlands on riparian corridors), instead of building a
multibillion-dollar filtration system. Residents and landowners
upstream were compensated for development restrictions incurred
from the MOA. New York State’s role as mediator eliminated bargaining barriers and effectively reduced the transaction costs of
arranging negotiations, demonstrating potential economic benefits to
all parties, and providing alternative options to unilateral regulatory
decisionmaking.

Externalities and the Pigouvian Tradition
Externalities exist when the effects of a transaction between two
parties spill over to nonparticipants. Effects can be either beneficial
(positive externalities) or harmful (negative externalities) to nonparticipants. When externalities are unaccounted for in the decisionmaking of the participants, transactions will result in either “too much”
or “too little” consumption or production. This very language, which
economists use, derives from modern welfare economics founded on
Pigou’s extension of marginal analysis to the utilitarian market-failure
analysis of J. S. Mill and Henry Sidgwick (Medema 2009).
In the history of welfare economics, the classical approach to solving negative externality problems, such as pollution, was through the
use of regulation, or what Mill (1871) termed “authoritative” solutions, “in which certain types of conduct are prescribed or proscribed”
2
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(Medema 2009: 37). Sometimes referred to as “command and control” policies, authoritative solutions prohibit firms from producing a
negative externality, require a certain standard of emissions of a negative externality be reached, or require firms to employ specific externality-reducing technologies, all backed by legal penalties. The
costliness and difficulty of obtaining information tailored to specific
firm production methods, in conjunction with the nondiscriminatory
or universality requirement of legal standards, generally yield uniform
standards across all firms in an industry. Yet, this type of policy
response often imposes solutions that are more costly than alternatives, inhibit innovations in pollution-reduction technologies, and
deter economic growth (Marlow 1995, Davis 1992).
Modern welfare economics, based on the work of Pigou in The
Economics of Welfare (1932), offers “corrective” taxation as another
solution. Pigou raised the solution specifically in relation to spillovers,
where he assumed there was a divergence between private and social
net products. Pigou (1932: 174) also addressed spillovers due to “the
separation between tenancy and ownership of certain durable instruments of production.” This divergence, he believed, could be removed
by renegotiating the landlord-tenant contract. However, Pigou
(1932: 192) argued that spillovers could not “be mitigated by a modification of the contractual relation between any two contracting parties, because the divergence arises out of a service or disservice
rendered to persons other than the contracting parties.” He did not
address the reasons why a contract could not be concluded by the contracting parties with those “persons other than the contracting parties.”
The Pigouvian tax solution to a pollution externality places responsibility on the firm producing the pollution. The government then
imposes a tax on emissions of a magnitude equal to the divergence
between social and private marginal costs, so that the external costs
are internalized into the decisions of the polluting firm. Pigouvian taxation differs from authoritative regulation because firms that pollute
above a set amount are forced to pay an emissions tax.1 Although
Pigouvian taxation reduces pollution at a very low cost, there are
problems that may arise. First, Pigouvian taxation will achieve pollution reduction only as long as the tax level is set equal to or above the
marginal cost of abatement (MCA). In the event the tax rate is set
1

An alternative to taxation is a subsidy of the appropriate magnitude. For brevity,
this alternative is not presented.
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below the MCA, pollution reduction will not take place. Second,
because some firms may have “modern, well-maintained pollution
control equipment,” while other (typically, older) firms possess outdated pollution control equipment, it is inefficient “for all firms to
carry identical burdens” (Marlow 1995: 96). Third, even if those
harmed by the pollution are compensated from corrective taxes, further complications may arise. Compensation is bound to be difficult
when not all affected parties suffer from the problem equally. Fourth,
it is costly to discover the appropriate level of the corrective tax, and
the information costs may exceed the benefits from implementing the
Pigouvian tax. Fifth, “compensation policies may also create a perverse incentive for individuals or firms to move into areas for the sole
purpose of receiving compensation payments” (Marlow 1995: 96).
In sum, Pigou’s analysis in both The Economics of Welfare and his
earlier Wealth and Welfare (1912) provided a list of examples where
self-regarding behavior creates divergences of private and social net
product (benefits, costs) providing “a strong sense that market failure
is a pervasive problem” (Medema 2009: 64).2 The Pigouvian framework, as further developed by Bergson (1938), Lange (1942), Meade
(1952), Graaf (1957), and Bator (1958) in mathematical form, gave to
modern welfare economics a seemingly powerful tool and standard
for welfare improvement:
The rhetorical, persuasive force of this analysis should not be
underestimated. What this theory demonstrated, in a nutshell, was that perfect markets work perfectly, imperfect markets work imperfectly, and perfect government can cause
imperfect markets to also function perfectly. This became the
textbook model [Medema 2009: 76].

The Coasean Argument and Framework
For Coase, the Pigouvian framework fails on several grounds, but
most fundamentally, he notes:
Analysis in terms of divergencies between private and social
products concentrates attention on particular deficiencies in
2

To be fair to Pigou, however, Medema has recovered a “lost” or, at least, relatively unknown essay that Pigou wrote in 1935 entitled State Action and LaisserFaire. Therein, Pigou’s examples of market failure produced by the existence of
external benefits or costs are balanced by a consideration of problems in carrying
out governmental solutions.
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the system and tends to nourish the belief that any measure
which will remove the deficiency is necessarily desirable. It
diverts attention from those other changes in the system
which are inevitably associated with the corrective measure,
changes which may well produce more harm than the original deficiency [Coase 1960: 42–43].

What is necessary, according to Coase (1960: 34), is an approach
comparing the total social product of alternative measures that gives
attention to alternative specification of property rights and the transaction costs associated with different property rights regimes. He
rejects the Pigouvian framing of the problem in terms of “restraining
the producer” of the negative externality:
We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature. To
avoid the harm to B would inflict harm on A. The real question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B
or should B be allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid
the more serious harm [Coase 1960: 2].

Indeed, making “restraining the producer” the problem to be
solved dictates the solution —whether making the producer liable for
damages, imposing a tax, offering a subsidy, or restricting the producer’s location. Such “solutions” take for granted that restricting the
producer causes less harm than restricting the recipient. Coase
(1960: 3) contends that the Pigouvian “courses of action are inappropriate, in that they lead to results which are not necessarily, or even
usually, desirable.” According to Coase (1960: 3), “If we assume that
the harmful effect of the pollution is that it kills the fish, the question
to be decided is: is the value of the fish lost greater or less than the
value of the product which the contamination of the stream makes
possible.”
If the proper procedure is to compare the total social product of
alternatives, then the assignment of property rights matters.
However, Coase shows that the assignment of property rights or the
assessment of damage liability only matters in a world of positive
transaction costs (that is, the world we actually inhabit):
The argument has proceeded up to this point on the
assumption . . . that there were no costs involved in carrying
out market transactions. This is, of course, a very unrealistic
assumption. In order to carry out a market transaction it is
5
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necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to
inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to
conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the
contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure
that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on.
These operations are often extremely costly, sufficiently
costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would be
carried out in a world in which the pricing system worked
without cost [Coase 1960: 15; emphasis added].

And yet, the Pigouvian framework is firmly anchored within a
world of zero transaction costs. In order to identify or measure the
divergence between private and social costs (benefits, or net
product), it is assumed that all necessary information is known, or at
least knowable, by the outside observer, regulator, politician, or welfare economist at zero cost—a result of what Coase terms “blackboard economics” where “all the information needed is assumed to
be available and the teacher plays all the parts” (Coase 1988: 19).
Following Hayek (1945: 519), one might add that such information is
best produced by market participants through individual interactions
within the price-forming market process.
In a world of positive transaction costs, institutions matter, especially in the delimitation of property rights. Two questions arise
regarding rights which Coase takes up in sections VI and VII, respectively, of The Problem of Social Cost: First, taking the initial specification of rights and the costs of market transactions as given, what
possible changes in the economic environment can produce more
efficient results? Second, what considerations will make the initial
delimitation of rights more favorable to efficient results?
Aslanbeigui and Medema (1998) illustrate three possible solutions
to the problem of externalities as outlined by Coase, if participants
find it too costly to reallocate resources through contracts/markets.
The first solution, in the case of producer-producer externalities,
would be to have a single owner take into account “all costs (internal
and external) and allocate resources in that light.” By doing this, the
“allocation of resources by administrative fiat would allow the firm to
overcome the transaction costs concerns that attend the use of the
market” (Aslanbeigui and Medema 1998: 604). One way of alleviating the problem of externalities would be for the two separate firms
to merge so that the externality is internalized and at a cost much less
than if regulatory policies were instated. However, Coase (1960: 16)
6
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recognizes that “it does not, of course, follow that the administrative
costs of organizing a transaction through a firm are inevitably less
than the costs of the market transactions which are superseded.”
In addition, if consumers are involved, this remedy would not suffice.
In cases
which may affect a vast number of people engaged in a wide
variety of activities, the administrative costs [of firm organization] might well be so high as to make any attempt to deal
with the problem within the confines of a single firm impossible. An alternative solution is direct government regulation.
Instead of instituting a legal system of rights, which can be
modified by transactions on the market, the government may
impose regulations which state what people must or must not
do and which have to be obeyed [Coase 1960: 17].

However, Coase (1960: 17) notes that while government has powers that might get things done at a lower cost than firms, the administrative costs of government itself can be “extremely costly.”
Restrictions made by fallible humans subject to political pressure
without competitive checks are unlikely to increase economic efficiency. He concludes that
direct governmental regulation will not necessarily give better results than leaving the problem to be solved by the market or the firm. But equally there is no reason why, on
occasion, such governmental administrative regulation should
not lead to an improvement in economic efficiency. This
would seem particularly likely when . . . a large number of
people are involved and in which therefore the costs of handling the problem through the market or the firm may be
high [Coase 1960: 17; emphasis added].

While authoritative regulation of externalities is not likely to give
better outcomes than markets or firms, it is more likely to do so in situations involving large numbers and high transaction costs.
In light of the imperfections of firms and authoritative regulation,
Coase (1960: 17) suggests that a third solution might sometimes be
best: “to do nothing about the problem at all.” This is the equivalent
of the policy conclusion derived from what is sometimes referred to
as the “Coase Theorem,” except that here it is derived not from an
artificial assumption about transaction costs, but a comparative
7
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analysis of the costs of organizing activity through the voluntary
arrangements of markets and/or firms versus authoritative regulation.
A policy of “doing nothing” is tantamount to leaving market participants to decide whether or not the costs of rights rearrangements
exceed the benefits from rearranging those rights through market
exchange. Coase argues that neither the Pigouvian solution of taxation nor the classical solution of authoritative regulation is necessary
if transaction costs are low, allowing for an agreement that benefits
all involved parties. Transaction costs are key, because even in the
face of externalities, an efficient outcome can occur through bargaining as long as costs do not outweigh gains.
This conclusion leads to a consideration of the original delimitation of rights. When private parties find it too costly to rearrange
rights via market transactions, courts and legislatures directly influence economic outcomes by their decisions on who holds what
rights. Those decisions influence both the allocation of resources and
the distribution of income and wealth. Coase presents evidence that
courts and legislatures in both Britain and the United States have
often understood this aspect of their decisions and have taken the
economic implications of their decisions into account. Moreover,
Coase (1960: 19) notes that “even when it is possible to change the
legal delimitation of rights through market transactions, it is obviously desirable to reduce the need for such transactions and thus
reduce the employment of resources in carrying them out.” Likewise,
“while statutory enactments add to the list of nuisances, action is also
taken to legalize what would otherwise be nuisances under the common law” (Coase 1960: 28). On this latter point, Coase is once again
highly critical of the “blackboard economics” approach of modern
welfare economics and economists who too quickly see an externality as a result of market failure “requiring corrective government
action [that] is, in fact, often the result of government action”
(Coase 1960: 28).
“The Problem of Social Cost” was Coase’s attempt to get economists to pay renewed attention to the actual institutional framework
within which economic decisions are made and economic activities
are coordinated through markets and firms. He focused on how
transaction costs altered the economic analysis suitable to mitigating
harmful effects. His analysis stemmed from his earlier work on the
Federal Communications Commission, which identified the factors
that prevent efficient allocation of rights and resources generally
8
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(Coase 1959: 27, n. 54). Coase clearly showed that the Pigouvian
basis of modern welfare economics and its concentration on divergent private and social margins was inadequate for the task. Unless
the role of transaction costs are made explicit, the policy responses
derived from Pigouvian analysis will continue to be inappropriate
and often undesirable.

Responses to Coase
The response of economists to “The Problem of Social Cost” has
almost uniformly been centered on the proposition that quickly came
to be known as the “Coase Theorem,” rather than the argument
Coase was making concerning the comparative evaluation of institutional frameworks. The Coase Theorem is typically presented as a
proposition about a zero transaction cost world. In what is regarded
as the first expression of the theorem, Stigler (1966: 113) stated:
“Under perfect competition private and social costs will be equal.”
Medema (2009: 177) gave an alternative rendition: “If rights are fully
specified and transaction costs are zero, parties to a dispute will bargain to an efficient and invariant outcome regardless of the initial
specification of legal rights.” There are two explicit assumptions and
two results embodied in his specification of the theorem. The explicit
assumptions are (1) full specification of rights and (2) zero transaction costs. The results are (1) Pareto efficiency and (2) invariance as
to the initial rights distribution. Some discussions of the theorem are
concerned with both results, others with just one (typically Pareto
efficiency). Many discussions inadequately render the explicit
assumptions and “can be dismissed under appropriate (some would
argue ‘correct’) conceptualizations of the meaning of fully specified
rights and zero transaction costs” (Medema 2009: 179).3
3

In The Applied Theory of Price, McCloskey (1985: 335–39) correctly (in our view)
identifies the “Coase Theorem” as follows: “In the presence of transaction costs
the location of a pollution tax or of other liability for damages does matter for efficiency.” McCloskey also importantly emphasizes that traditional Pigouvian taxation schemes, by using damages rather than the appropriate minimum
opportunity cost of abatement, are inefficient. Finally, McCloskey observes that
what the profession usually terms the “Coase Theorem” is really nothing more
than “Adam Smith’s Generalization” that if everything is owned and transactions
are costless, then efficiency is obtained (“the Invisible Hand theorem”). The
attempt to draw attention to Coase’s central message and away from Pigouvian
analysis, unfortunately, has been resisted by the profession as a whole.
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The primary criticisms directed at (these versions of) the Coase
Theorem point to its limited applicability and a restrictive set of
assumptions without which the theorem breaks down. Canterbery
and Marvasti (1992: 1180) argue that the theorem “borders on circularity” because externalities arise due to transactions costs, but externalities persist because of the transaction costs of removing them,
leading to “Ptolemaic epicycles extending the ‘Coase Theorem’.”
Cooter (1982) questions the existence of a Coase Theorem because
Coase never stated the theorem and other economists have generalized the examples developed by Coase. Further, Cooter argues that
in the absence of a third party’s coercive force, parties will react to
the harshest threats, so political power plays an enormous role in
negotiation and may prevent efficient results. Samuelson (1963) contends that even in a zero transaction cost world, bilateral monopoly
could prevent efficiency. Coase (1988: 161) responded that he
believed “the proportion of cases in which no agreement is reached
will be small,” and has been faulted for not using real-world examples
in support of this assertion (Black, Grant, and Islam 2008: 2). This is
but the tip of the iceberg of a vast literature, much of which seems
irrelevant to the world of positive transaction costs. This literature is
dealt with at some length in Medema and Zerbe (2000).
David Friedman (1990) offers a defense of Coasean bargaining in
a world of positive transaction costs, using the case of airplane noise
plaguing a nearby residential area. Alternative solutions, Friedman
suggests, are mandating airlines to make quieter planes, closing the
airport when residents are sleeping, or soundproofing homes.
“Charging the airlines for the cost of the noise they produce gives
them an incentive to reduce noise, but that may be the wrong
solution—it might be less costly to soundproof the houses or pay
their occupants to move out.” Unfortunately, when information is
costly, it may be impossible to actually tell what will be the best solution for all of the parties involved. Since both parties essentially produce the problem, Friedman (1990) argues:
Where we do not know who can solve the problem at lowest
cost, the best solution may be to fall back on Coase’s other
idea: negotiations between the parties. . . . [T]he best solution
to such problems may be for the legal system to clearly define
who has the right to do what and then permit the affected
individuals to bargain among themselves.
10
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Regardless of whether the airline is held liable for noise damage
or not, using Coasean bargaining may be the only way to discover the
relevant alternatives toward finding a solution. Costly bargaining is
preferable to uninformed guesses that mandate particular solutions,
and may bring about a more efficient outcome once property rights
are assigned. Using Coasean bargaining to resolve this issue will
result in a more efficient allocation because whoever values the land
the most will pay to use it.4
Criticisms of the viability of bargaining solutions within a Coasean
framework, especially in addressing negative externality problems
such as pollution, have been numerous. Some critics stress that it
matters who owns the property rights in environmental pollution
cases and that it may be difficult to assign such rights (Samuelson
1995, Abrego and Whalley 2004). Others point out that we do not live
in a zero transaction cost universe (Varian 1995, Nalebuff 1997,
Anderlini and Felli 2006). Moreover, Tybout (1972) argues that even
in a zero transaction costs model, bribery to reduce pollution and
compensation charges for it result in different total profits, so that
long-run behaviors of parties may differ, negating any usefulness of
the Coase Theorem. Frech (1973) refutes Tybout, arguing that zero
transaction costs are based on a fundamental error in the analysis of
costs for the polluting and polluted industries. He holds that a property right to the polluted area is a valuable asset with a definite market value. Because of this, when the rent of this asset is properly
included in the costs of the industry holding the right, both marginal
and total profits are shown to be identical regardless of who is
assigned ownership of the asset.
Many detractors of the applicability of Coasean bargaining to
environmental spillovers draw on Meade’s (1952) case of honeybees. Meade argued that because bees cannot be convinced to
respect property rights or keep contracts, contracts cannot be practically applied. The only solution would be to either subsidize farmers who grow nectar-rich crops or simply accept the inefficiency in
the joint production of crops and honey. Two later articles, by
Cheung (1973) and Johnson (1973), demonstrated that contracts
4
Cooter and Ulen (1997: 89) argue that “the normative Coase theorem” consists
of the claim that law should be structured to minimize the impediments to
bargaining.
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between beekeepers and farmers had been common practice since
early in the 20th century, and Cheung also showed that the evident
pricing pattern is actually efficient.
Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) published a paper empirically proving the relevance of Coasean bargaining in situations where there are
two or three parties bargaining. Subsequently, the authors extended
their work to report the results of controlled experiments designed to
test the theorem for larger groups—an issue on which there is very
little empirical work. Using 4, 10, and 20 parties with full and limited
information, they found 93 percent of the bargaining outcomes to be
efficient and that there was no deterioration of the results as the bargaining groups got larger. Although there was some deterioration in
moving from full to limited information, almost 100 percent of the
full-information bargains were efficient (Hoffman and Spitzer 1995).
One implication of this result is that policymakers should recognize
the power of voluntary negotiations to overcome negative externality
problems, even in the absence of government intervention. But more
relevant for our purposes, these results support the applicability of
Coasean bargaining for disputes involving large numbers.
The world of zero transaction costs is, as Coase (1988: 15)
remarks, “the world of modern economic analysis, and therefore
economists feel quite comfortable handling the intellectual problems
it poses.” Once transaction costs are recognized to exist, however, the
evaluation of alternative economic arrangements for possible
improvement must include a comparison of those costs. This is the
basis for Coase’s argument for comparative institutional analysis and
also the basis for his critique of Pigouvian taxation as a policy norm.
The Coasean framework has given rise to strong views both for
and against its applicability. But the main weakness on the side of its
supporters has been the scarcity of real-life scenarios of large number negative externalities where private Coasean bargaining resulted
in externality mitigation. While a literature has developed in which
“an assortment of cases . . . illustrates the voluntary internalization of
externalities (both positive and negative) in history” (Higgs 2005:
407–08), no clear case of pollution mitigation involving large numbers of geographically dispersed affected parties has been forthcoming. This has prompted continuing debate on policy alternatives
relying on Pigouvian taxation or forms of authoritative regulation to
correct for inefficiencies caused by such large-number externalities.
Interestingly, one recent public bargaining outcome confirms the
12
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validity of Coasean bargaining in large-number situations that also
involves nonpoint source pollution—factors that are traditionally
considered to be inimical to its applicability. An examination of the
recent New York City Watershed Agreement is a material example
demonstrating the cogency of Coasean bargaining in providing a private solution to a negative externality problem, with only a limited
role for government as mediator. In this solution, there was no need
to implement any taxes, fees, or even “green payments” (Wu and
Babcock 1996) to internalize the externality, as is the norm in
addressing agricultural nonpoint source pollution.

History of the New York City Water Supply System
Unlike most other cities that rely on ground water, modern New
York City is one of the few places in the world where the water comes
from surface sources—namely, the Croton or East of Hudson
(EOH) and the Catskill/Delaware or West of Hudson (WOH) watersheds in upstate New York. Together, these two watersheds comprise 19 reservoirs and 3 controlled lakes, storing 580 billion gallons
of water (Daily and Ellison 2002). Early settlers of NYC obtained
water for domestic purposes from private and public wells, and
beginning in 1800, the Manhattan Company pumped water into a
reservoir. In 1830, a tank for fire protection was added. As the population grew and well-water became polluted, NYC looked for alternatives (NYC Department of Environmental Protection [hereafter
DEP] 2012).
After exploring alternatives for increasing supply, NYC built and
placed into service what is now known as the Old Croton Aqueduct,
which carried water impounded from the Croton River, in what is
now Westchester County, into the Old Croton Reservoir.
Distribution reservoirs were located in NYC, with locations varying
and number increasing over time. The New Croton Aqueduct, built
from 1885 to 1893, was placed in service in 1890. The various water
systems of the NYC boroughs were consolidated into the present
water supply system. The New York State legislature created the
Board of Water Supply in 1905, and the Board moved to impound
the waters of Esopus Creek, one of four Catskill watersheds, and
develop what is known as the Catskill System, which includes the
Ashokan Reservoir and Catskill Aqueduct. This project was completed in 1915 and turned over to the NYC Department of Water
13
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Supply, Gas, and Electricity for operation and maintenance. The
Catskill System was completed in 1928 with the building of the
Schoharie Reservoir and Shandaken Tunnel (NYC DEP 2012).
In 1928, the Board of Water Supply also received approval to
develop the upper portion of the Rondout watershed and tributaries
of the Delaware River within New York State. Work was delayed by
a lawsuit brought by the State of New Jersey to enjoin NYC and the
State of New York from using waters of any Delaware River tributary. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld NYC’s right to augment its
water supply from the Delaware River, and construction of the
Delaware System began in March 1937, to eventually be completed
in stages (Delaware Aqueduct, Rondout Reservoir, Neversink
Reservoir, Pepacton Reservoir, and Cannonsville Reservoir) by 1964
(NYC DEP 2012).
New York City controversially used eminent domain to build
reservoirs in the early and mid-20th century. Between 1907 and
1915, several hamlets were taken using eminent domain and used to
build reservoirs, displacing roughly 2,000 people. Another 350 residents were displaced a few years later, and finally 1,500 more after
WWII (Catskill Watershed Corporation 2005).
The system impounds water in three upstate reservoir systems and
three controlled lakes. The three water collection systems have various interconnections to increase flexibility by permitting exchange of
water from one to another. Localized droughts and excess water supplies of the three watersheds are thereby mitigated (NYC DEP
2012). The NYC water supply system, with its sources (the
“Watershed”) that span 8 counties and 60 towns (CCCD 1997, Art.
I, Sec. 4–5), is generally regarded as a monumental hydraulic and
civil engineering achievement that provides approximately 1.5 billion
gallons of water daily to the customer distribution system.

Background to the New York City Watershed Agreement
For many years, NYC’s water has been among the highest rated
in the nation for quality (USEPA 1996). The quality of the water
coming from the surface sources of the WOH watersheds remained
high, though concerns over development in the areas surrounding
the watershed mounted. Development had particularly been a problem around the Croton system (which accounts for approximately 10
percent of the total supply), which was, by the early 1990s, already
14
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filtered. In 1989, the EPA expressed concern about the developments around the NYC watersheds that were primarily driven by
growth in tourism in the area. “In 1989, EPA’s Surface Water
Treatment Rule (SWTR), issued under the federal Safe Water
Drinking Act, required filtration of all surface water supplies (rivers
and lakes) to protect against microbial contamination of drinking
water” (USEPA 1996). Specifically, the regulation required that all
surface water systems serving populations greater than 10,000 filter
their water for microbial contaminants and reduce turbidity
(USEPA 1989). New York City officials were already concerned
about water quality when the EPA released the SWTR. In January
1991, the New York State Department of Health, acting as the
EPA’s designated agency to carry out the Safe Drinking Water Act,
ordered NYC to build a water filtration plant for the
Catskill/Delaware system—the watershed that supplies 90 percent
of NYC’s water. A filtration system, however, would come at a high
price. New York City “estimated that it would cost from $4 to $6 billion to filter the Catskill/Delaware supplies, which would more than
double current water rates” (CCCD 1997: 3).
The high cost of filtration created economic incentives for NYC to
seek alternatives. The regulation also provided an alternative to costly
filtration. The “requirement can be waived if a water system’s treatment processes and natural conditions provide safe water and if the
watershed is actively protected to ensure that safety in the future”
(USEPA 1996). In 1990, hoping to attain a Filtration Avoidance
Determination (FAD), the Department of Environmental
Protection for NYC drafted a Watershed Protection Plan that
updated watershed rules, proposing regulatory changes to restrict
construction of roads, parking lots, and storage facilities for hazardous substances and waste. NYC received a conditional FAD in
January 1993. One condition of the FAD was that NYC issue final
proposed Watershed regulations, begin to acquire land and conservation easements by June 30, 1994, and upgrade sewage treatment
plants in the Watershed (CCCD 1997: 3). In addition, SWTR criteria required NYC “to show, through ownership or agreements with
landowners, that it could control human activities in the watershed
with the potential to harm the microbiological quality of the source
water” (NYC DEP 2006: 3).
Acquiring the needed land or easements on land, and imposing
new Watershed regulations would prove difficult, given that in 1991
15
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only 27 percent of WOH land was publicly owned. Recalling NYC’s
use of eminent domain to build reservoirs in the early and mid-20th
century, communities feared that the proposed plan would stifle economic growth and damage property values (NRC 2000: 26). These
communities organized in 1991, forming the Coalition of Watershed
Towns (CWT) comprised of more than 30 watershed towns, villages,
and hamlets (CCCD 1997: 3), with the goals of ensuring proposed
regulations would not prevent reasonable community development
and limiting the regulations to the minimum needed to protect water
quality (NRC 2000: 26). In late 1993, NYC filed an application for a
water supply permit with plans to acquire watershed acreage and
submitted to the EPA a long-term filtration avoidance program for
the Catskill/Delaware System. Uncertainty over NYC’s intent to use
eminent domain and the perception by upstate communities that
costs were being shifted onto them led the CWT and others to file
lawsuits to prevent NYC’s plans being implemented, leading to an
impasse in efforts to reach a compromise on watershed management
plans (NRC 2000: 27).
According to the 1990 plan, New York City assumed the right to
regulate its watershed, pushing many of the costs onto the residents
of watershed communities. The CWT, charged with protecting the
interests of watershed communities, towns, villages, and hamlets,
prevented this move through litigation. The State of New York had
recognized the right of watershed communities and of private
landowners in the watershed to be free of NYC regulation.
Determined to pursue an FAD, New York City and the EPA asked
the State of New York for help. In April 1995, Governor George
Pataki organized a meeting among the involved parties (representatives from New York City, the EPA, the CWT, Putnam and
Westchester counties, and others) to resolve the multitude of issues
involving the Watershed (CCCD 1997: 4). New York City was desperate to strike a deal, while the watershed communities were not
interested in making any deal that pushed costs onto them.

The Coasean Framework of the New York City
Watershed Agreement
New York City and the State of New York wanted to assure the
continued supply of high quality water for the eight million residents
of NYC, the one million New York residents outside the City who
16

Coasean Framework

depend on the watersheds, and the millions of tourists who visit each
year. However, New York City neither wanted to invest in the installation of the multibillion-dollar filtration system nor to incur future
stream maintenance and upgrade costs. NYC suggested environmental regulations be prescribed for upstream, thereby reducing potential contamination. NYC also needed the watershed communities to
cooperate with new rules and regulations in order to obtain the FAD
which would lower NYC’s costs of meeting the SWTR.
Because of the strict requirements of obtaining the FAD, any
agreement reached between NYC and the watershed communities
would have to be comprehensive. With the watershed communities
having been recognized as holding the property right, NYC would
have to compensate them for costs imposed by new rules and regulations. The Hudson RiverKeeper Fund, a local environmental
group, argued that environmental protection could not happen without a strong economy. Farmers in the regional communities, represented by the CWT, were already feeling burdened by previous
watershed restrictions and wary of new implementations such as
nonpoint source pollution limits. Residents in the watershed communities also did not want to pay for upgrading their septic systems, a
proposal from previous negotiations. The potential gains on both
sides from bargaining were high, considering the immense cost of the
proposed filtration plant.
Arranging negotiations between affected parties appeared cost prohibitive. The scope ranged from individual landowners to the State of
New York, from residents of villages to the masses of New York City,
and from environmental groups to the federal government. The magnitude of suggested pollution control efforts was on the order of billions of dollars. Nonpoint source pollution and water’s physical nature
amplified the circumstances. Agricultural runoff containing pesticides
and fertilizers was increasing. Outdated septic systems were deteriorating, spilling contaminants into the flow. The regional residents portrayed a relaxed and uninformed stance about water pollution. Many
parties were responsible for the degradation of water quality, but few
were accountable. Generally, NYC found fault with the upstream
landowners and government’s lack of regulation. The Catskills region
confronted a financial burden of maintaining livelihoods while meeting regulations that provided benefits only downstream.
This problem traditionally would have been relegated to Pigouvian
taxation, subsidization, or authoritative regulation due to the scope,
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magnitude, and dispersion of the pollutants. However, Pigouvian
taxation would have been ineffective because the contamination is
diffuse, making it difficult to pinpoint the responsible party.
Subsidization would have resulted in inefficient and uncertain allocation of funds. Further authoritative regulation would have been
fraught with market inefficiencies, monitoring difficulties, and
enforcement costs.
Given that the State of New York recognized the right of watershed
communities and of private landowners in the Watershed to be free of
regulation from New York City, the foundation of a Coasean bargaining solution had been laid. Within the scope of a Coasean framework,
property rights were decidedly held by the watershed communities. In
this case, the multiplicity of externalities and the high potential gains
for all parties indicates Coasean bargaining— contrary to the limitations described in literature—could provide for a more efficient solution, with government-assisted mediation, creating a partnership
toward parallel, compatible goals.
Governor Pataki’s bringing together of the interested parties eventually led to an announcement on November 2, 1995, that the parties
“had reached an Agreement in Principle outlining the measures that
would be taken to maintain and enhance the quality of the City’s
drinking water supply, while protecting the economic vitality and
social character of watershed communities” (CCCD 1997: 4). The
EPA played an important role during negotiations, remaining flexible
with temporary FADs while the negotiations were under way,
though still monitoring the drinking water in NYC, to verify it was
within compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act. The
Agreement in Principle built the foundation on which the 1997
Memorandum of Agreement was erected. Table 1 provides a timeline of the important events in the MOA history.
The Memorandum of Agreement is a legally binding agreement
enforceable in court. It was officially signed and accepted in January
1997 and gave New York City the comprehensive watershed management plan it needed to fulfill the requirements of the SWTR and
obtain a five year FAD. The EPA issued a five-year Filtration
Avoidance Determination on May 6, 1997, requiring “New York City
to acquire environmentally-sensitive land in the Watershed, adopt
strong watershed rules and regulations and institute and maintain a
comprehensive watershed protection program” (USEPA 2010).
During the negotiations of the MOA, the EPA set the minimum
18
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TABLE 1
New York City Watershed MOA:
Timeline of Important Dates
Year
1986
1989

1990

1991

1992
1993

1995

1997

2000
2001
2002

2006

Events
The Federal Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments are
signed into law.
The U.S. EPA promulgates the Surface Water Treatment
Rule, requiring that all surface water systems serving over
10,000 people filter their water or obtain an exemption by
ensuring the protection and quality of their water.
New York City’s Dept. of Environmental Protection releases
a draft of its plan to protect the quality of the water (the
Watershed Protection Plan).
Coalition of Watershed Towns (CWT) comprised of
30 watershed towns is formed in response to NYC’s proposed watershed management plan.
New York State declares New York City may not use eminent domain or regulate watershed community activities.
Jan.: EPA grants New York City a temporary Filtration
Avoidance Determination.
Dec.: EPA grants NYC an FAD effective until Dec. 1996.
Governor Pataki brings together the CWT, NYC, and EPA to
discuss the problem. Agreement in Principle is reached
between New York City and other identified stakeholders.
Jan: Memorandum of Agreement is signed and formally
accepted.
May: NYC is issued a five-year FAD, with ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the watershed.
EPA conducts mid-term review of the 1997 FAD, provides
feedback to the City, and makes further recommendations.
NYCDEP submits to EPA its 2001 Long-Term Watershed
Protection Program.
Original five-year FAD is re-examined. WAP is expanded,
and further regulations are recommended on storm water
treatment and WWTPs, among other things.
NYC receives another five-year FAD from the EPA.
EPA passes new regulation requiring UV filtration of
drinking water to prevent cryptosporidium outbreaks.
Construction begins on the new UV filtration plant.
Continued
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TABLE 1 (cont.)
New York City Watershed MOA:
Timeline of Important Dates
Year

2007

2011

Events
NYC releases 2006 Long-Term Watershed Protection
Program, which promotes better stream management.
EPA reviews the FAD, and again makes recommendations.
NYC receives a 10-year FAD, with regular reviews to be
conducted and ongoing monitoring.
NYC releases 2011 Long-Term Watershed Protection
Program, which pushes for better riparian zone protection
along streams and rivers.

standards and regulations necessary for obtaining an FAD, and facilitated provisions in the MOA that would allow NYC to attain it.
The specifics of the agreement demonstrate how the State of New
York worked on each involved party’s behalf. This assistance, particularly by Governor Pataki, facilitated meeting arrangements and negotiation, thereby reducing total costs below the perceived gains that
would be garnered by an amiable resolution. The State allowed NYC
to make direct payments to affected counties totaling $250 million,
enhancing the regional economy while making NYC appear philanthropic. The MOA determined, also with the State’s insistence, a
requirement that NYC purchase vast amounts of land around the
Watershed. This acquisition program deemed New York City responsible for its water quality and simultaneously averted its potential
expenditure on a new water filtration facility. Finally, the State supported the watershed communities by creating programs such as the
Catskill Fund for the Future, managed jointly by the Catskill
Watershed Corporation (also created specifically for the Agreement)
and the State Environmental Facilities Corporation.
The New York City Watershed Agreement’s main components fall
broadly under three themes: (1) the land acquisition program,
(2) distinct watershed rules and regulations, and (3) protection and
partnership programs. Additionally, the Watershed Agricultural
Program provided incentives for farmers and ranchers to implement
practices that reduce water pollution.
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Land Acquisition Program
The purpose of the land acquisition program (Art. II of the MOA)
is for NYC to acquire fee title or conservation easements on important land in the Watershed on a volunteer basis limited to 300,000
acres total or 30 percent of the Watershed. The MOA specifically
prohibits NYC from obtaining land through eminent domain (Art. II,
Sec. 59) as well as ensuring that all land is acquired from willing sellers (Sec. 61). In the MOA, New York City committed to set aside
$250 million for the land acquisition program (Sec. 74 [a]), to pay fair
market value for property acquired (Sec. 61), and to provide due
notification to the town or village and appropriate county before
commencing solicitation (Sec. 60). New York City is also required to
pay local and county taxes on property acquired or a portion of taxes
on land under conservation easement. The Agreement allows for
development-limiting conservation easements to be purchased by
NYC. Land near intakes into the water system or located in subbasins are highest priority while land located further from reservoirs
and intakes are low priority.

Watershed Rules and Regulations
Article III of the MOA covers watershed rules and regulations on
wastewater treatment plants to product use and storage. Article V
creates several key partnership programs that administer NYC funds
to the watershed communities and residents for the purpose of assisting them in observing the new regulations. These grants can be used
to assist in upgrading and replacing equipment, or building new facilities necessitated by the new regulations. While the State of
New York is responsible for enforcing the new restrictions, funds are
available for upgrading septic systems, salt and other snowmelt material storage, as well as community education programs and forestry
management programs. This portion of the Agreement served the
original EPA stipulation for the City’s drinking water standards. The
regulations also require continued water quality monitoring and
studies.

Watershed Protection and Partnership Programs
The protection and partnership programs (Art. V of the MOA)
comprise an array of Agreement-initiated projects for land management, waste treatment, economic development, and education, each
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cluster having access to financial aid. Many of the opportunities provide assistance creating best management practices for land and
resource management. The MOA allocates $75 million for new
sewage treatment infrastructure facilities for towns, villages, and
hamlets. The Catskill Water Corporation (CWC) is allocated $3.5
million to fund its operating expenses, and administer or consult for
New Sewage Infrastructure Funds, the Catskill Fund for the Future,
the Stormwater Fund, the Septic System and Rehabilitation
Program, Sand and Salt Storage Facilities, Stormwater retrofits,
Stream Corridor Protection, the Alternative Design Septic Program,
Public Education, and the Economic Development Study (CCCD
1997: 20–22). The aforementioned Catskill Fund for the Future is a
loan and grant program for qualified development proposals. Fundsupported projects must enhance the economic base of the community in a manner not inimical to protection of regional water quality.
Finally, the MOA provides for “Good Neighbor Payments” by
New York City that can be used for a variety of specified purposes
within the municipalities to which the gift is paid, including “capital
costs of designing, constructing and installing public works or public
improvements, or purchasing public equipment, except for automobiles for six or less passengers, which will benefit the public at large”
(Sec. 147[b][iii]).
Table 2 displays a list of the protection and partnership programs
and the funds allocated to each respectively and indicates whether it
is administered by or facilitated in consultation with the CWC.

Watershed Agricultural Program
Farm runoff, as nonpoint source pollution, is difficult to regulate
(Hardy and Koontz 2008: 301–02). Instead of regulating agricultural
practices in the MOA, the New York City Department of
Environmental Protection and the EPA pushed for the establishment of the Watershed Agricultural Program (WAP). Article V of
the MOA establishes and funds the WAP, the goal of which is “to
refine and demonstrate an environmentally sound approach to farm
management” (NRC 2000: 522). The function of the WAP is to provide economic incentives for farmers and ranchers of larger operations in the WOH watershed to develop Whole Farm Plans on a
voluntary basis. “Whole Farm Plans are intended to reduce pollutant loadings by using innovative best management practices
(BMPs)” (NRC 2000: 28).
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TABLE 2
Overview of Major Partnership Programs
Protection and Partnership Programs
Sewage Treatment Infrastructure*
Catskill Fund for the Future*
Stormwater Fund*
Septic Rehabilitation & Replacement*
Sand and Salt Storage Facilities*
Sewer Extensions
Good Neighbor Payments
Stormwater Retrofits*
SPDES Upgrades
Catskill Watershed Corporation
Stream Corridor Protection*
Tax Consulting Fund
Alternate Design Septics*
Public Education
Forestry Management Program
Economic Development Study*
Total

Allocated Funds
$75.0 M
$59.7 M
$31.7 M
$13.6 M
$10.25 M
$10.0 M
$9.765 M
$7.625 M
$5.0 M
$3.5 M
$3.0 M
$3.0 M
$3.0 M
$2.0 M
$0.5 M
$0.5 M
$238.14 M

*Indicates a program in consultation with or administered by the Catskill
Watershed Corporation.
Source: CCCD (1997: 19).

Implementation, Enforcement, and Early History
of the MOA
Because the MOA is a legally binding agreement, it was necessary
to implement some mechanism to ensure ongoing compliance and
cooperation. The purpose behind the establishment of the CWC is
for the nonprofit, locally-administered corporation to oversee,
authorize funding for, or act as consultants for many of the programs
provided for in the MOA (CCCD 1997: 26). Local enforcement of
regulations and administration/implementation of programs is
important to ensure compliance and cooperation.
In addition to the CWC, the Watershed Protection and Partnership
Council (WPPC) is established in the MOA. This Council, which
consists of representatives from city and state government agencies,
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watershed counties, environmental groups, the CWC, the EPA, and
the Watershed Agricultural Council, serves as a forum for the
exchange of views, periodically reviews efforts undertaken by governments and private parties to protect the Watershed, and solicits input
from agencies and private organizations and persons with an interest in
the Watershed and New York City drinking water (NRC 2000: 123).
The oversight by the CWC and WPPC is supplemented by EPA
Region 2 along with the NYC DEP and NYC Department of Health
continuing to monitor water quality. Specifically, NYC implemented
an ongoing water quality monitoring program, and the FAD is subject to continual review by the EPA, which ensures that sufficient
progress is being made on MOA agreements and that EPA regulations are met. A May 2000 EPA review of the 1997 Filtration
Avoidance Determination (FAD) concluded that, although NYC had
made significant progress in many of its watershed protection programs, a number of corrective actions for specific FAD tasks as well
as program enhancements needed to be implemented for the longterm viability of filtration avoidance (USEPA 2002). Due to the midterm review and recommendations, NYC expedited its efforts on
WWTPs in the Watershed region and acquired the needed land and
easements to satisfy the EPA. On December 15, 2001, NYC DEP
submitted to EPA its Long-Term Watershed Protection Program,
emphasizing watershed protection as a long-term commitment
(USEPA 2002). The EPA viewed the 2001 Long-Term Watershed
Protection Program as a significant improvement upon the original
MOA and applauded NYC’s long-term commitment. The City
released updated Long-Term Watershed Protection Programs based
on mid-term reviews and recommendations in the year prior to the
end of the FAD period in 2006 and 2011, respectively.
At the end of the five-year FAD in 2002, the provisions of the
MOA were again reexamined. Among the notable changes in the
2002 MOA were (1) the expansion of the Watershed Agricultural
Program to include EOH watershed farms as well as small farms that
previously did not meet the program’s gross farm income participation threshold;5 (2) updates to the treatment of storm water;
(3) increased outreach and education programs; and (4) a new focus

5
As a result, by January 2006, 28 whole farm plans and 42 small farm whole farm
plans had been approved by the Croton EOH watershed (USEPA 2011).
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on the Kensico river basin, through which as much as 60 percent of
the water in the Catskill/Delaware watersheds flows (USEPA 2002).
Additional funds were committed to the Septic System Program to
more actively address problems with failing septic systems, and active
stream management was also encouraged in the 2002 FAD, creating
a Stream Management Program to increase riparian zones and
thereby decrease turbidity in streams feeding surface water sources.
The EPA determined that NYC’s 2001 Long-Term Watershed
Protection Program “if complied with, will achieve the objectives of
the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Surface Water Treatment Rule
for unfiltered systems” (USEPA 2002). New York City received
another five-year FAD from the EPA based on its own 2001 LongTerm Watershed Protection Program and its commitments to the
recommendations in the 2002 FAD.
During the 2002–07 FAD timeframe, new EPA regulations
required NYC to build a UV filtration facility. Construction began in
2006 and finished in 2010, allowing NYC to filter all of the water for
cryptosporidium and other microbial pathogens (USEPA 2011). The
revised FAD was granted to NYC based on the plans to construct
the UV filtration plant and for the City to provide an additional
$6 million to Wastewater Management Programs in the Watershed
region (USEPA 2006a). A 2006 review of the progress on the various
programs and implementation of MOA provisions notes, “Overall,
the City has successfully satisfied the obligations specified in the
2002 FAD” (USEPA 2006b). Having made satisfactory progress during the 2002–07 FAD period, NYC was again issued an FAD, this
time for 10 years (USEPA 2007).
Discussions surrounding the 2007 FAD received mixed input
from various groups. Watershed communities expressed fear that
further land acquisition by NYC would stifle local growth and economic activities while environmental groups urged an increase in
land acquisition (USEPA 2007). The addition of the Stream
Management Program was continued and bolstered in the 2007
FAD, along with a more comprehensive Riparian Buffer Protection
Program designed to provide technical assistance to “streamside
landowners who seek to implement stabilization and planting plans
to enhance riparian buffers” (USEPA 2007).
In 2011, NYC released its renewed Long-Term Watershed
Protection Program. The major update is a 15-year extension of the
land acquisition program in conjunction with the New York State
25

Cato Journal

Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) issuance of
the City’s Water Supply Permit. “The WSP resulted from extensive
discussions among the City, NYSDEC, NYSDOH, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Watershed counties, the Coalition
of Watershed Towns, environmental groups, and other stakeholders”
and extends financial and other commitments for MOA programs
(NYC DEP 2011). Currently, NYC is in compliance with the MOA
and the regulations promulgated by the EPA.

Conclusion
The New York City Watershed MOA is the first of its kind. While
most discussions of the Coasean approach describe it as applicable
only to externality cases in which the number of actors is identifiable
and few in number, the MOA exemplifies the possibility of successful Coasean negotiations for large-number, large-scale, high-impact
externality problems. The consequences of this MOA could be measured in billions of dollars, and the impact measured in over 1,900
acres and by well over 9 million people. The negotiations forged a
new method for dealing with externalities showing how Coasean
solutions could be facilitated and used in wide-reaching economic
conflicts.
Every component of the Agreement reveals support for the
regional economy and places the burden of water quality on NYC. In
Coasean bargaining terms, the State assigned the watershed communities the property rights to continue with regional development and
current practices, although degrading to NYC’s drinking water. This
assignment positioned NYC as the responsible party for initiating
negotiation and programs protecting the Watershed system. Once
responsibility was established, NYC opted to buy lands that were
contributing to water quality degradation, such as farmlands on riparian corridors, instead of building a multibillion-dollar filtration system. The residents and landowners upstream are compensated for
development restrictions incurred from the Agreement.
Furthermore, the role of the State as a mediator eliminated bargaining barriers by effectively reducing the transaction costs of arranging
negotiations, demonstrating potential economic benefits to all parties, and providing alternative options to unilateral decisionmaking.
The negotiations of the MOA set a new precedent in addressing
externalities that involve a large number of stakeholders. The parties
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to the MOA included stakeholders from various communities including the CWT, NYC, governmental organizations such as the EPA and
New York State, and environmental groups including the Catskill
Center for Conservation and Development. Many of the stakeholders were identified prior to the negotiation process because of the
aforementioned conflict between NYC and the CWT, which is comprised of more than 30 municipalities and towns within the
Watershed region. Environmental groups were brought into negotiations because of the environmentally sensitive nature of the land
and system under consideration. The farming community of the
Watershed area, although not directly involved in the negotiations,
was represented by the CWT.6
The New York City Watershed MOA raises the possibility that
governments can perform the role of simplifying negotiations in a way
that will meet the overall social objectives and lead to Pareto improvement. Overall, when we observe externality problems, “We should
ask not merely where the problem comes from, but what the transaction costs are that prevent it from being bargained out of existence”
(Friedman 2000: 40). As demonstrated by the MOA, the government’s role simplified negotiations for New York City by drastically
reducing the costs of negotiation. Rather than the traditional regulatory approach to externality problems, a Coasean approach was facilitated by new forms of relationships between different branches of
government and affected parties in the private sector.
Of interest here is the organic manner in which the reduction in
externality losses was achieved. Although the participants were
engaged in a process of the type envisioned by Coase, nowhere in the
documents relating to the agreement and the follow-up is Ronald
Coase or any version of the Coase Theorem mentioned. Rather, once
property rights were established, participants did what people do
whenever they have goals and must negotiate with others to meet
them. The spontaneous order that arose is clearly Coasean, even
though none of the participants were likely aware that they were
engaged in activity suggested by a Nobel laureate.
The MOA and subsequent revisions serve as an example of how
large-scale, large-number externalities can be successfully internalized through the kind of negotiation Coase advocated in his
6
The originally proposed regulations created concern for watershed farmers due
to the loss of as much as 25 percent of tillable land (NRC 2000: 28).
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work. While the State of New York and the EPA facilitated the initial negotiations, subsequent discussions have taken place using
the mechanisms established within the original MOA and from
commentary solicited by the EPA. New programs and revisions
are made on an ongoing basis with input from all concerned parties. Overall, the New York City Watershed Memorandum of
Agreement is a huge success, and demonstrates the ability of the
market to resolve externality problems with the help of minor state
intervention.
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